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Abstract: We describe a new class of packet injection attacks called Man-on-the-Side (MotS), previously only seen
where state actors have “compromised” a number of telecommunication companies. MotS injection attacks
have not been widely investigated in scientific literature, despite having been discussed by news outlets and
security blogs. MotS came to attention after the Edward Snowden revelations, which described large scale
pervasive monitoring of the Internet’s infrastructure. For an advanced adversary attempting to interfere with
IT connected systems, the next logical step is to adapt this class of attack to a smaller scale, such as enterprise
or critical infrastructure networks. MotS is a weaker form of attack compared to a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM).
A MotS attack allows an adversary to read and inject packets, but not modify packets sent by other hosts. This
paper presents practical experiments where we have implemented and performed MotS attacks against two
testbeds: 1) on HTTP connections, by redirecting a victim to a host controlled by an adversary; and 2) on
an Industrial Control network, where we inject falsified command responses to the victim. In both cases,
the victims accept the injected packets without generating a suspiciously large number of unusual packets on
the network. We then perform an analysis of three leading Network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to
determine whether the attacks are detected, and discuss mitigation methods.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Snowden revelations have been a driving fac-
tor towards a more secure digital world. One clear
example of this is that TLS has become widely de-
ployed on systems which previously did not use en-
cryption. This paper builds upon leaked information
regarding MotS attacks. MotS has traditionally been
considered only achievable by a global pervasive ad-
versary (Trammell et al., 2015), such as a state actor,
who is capable of using their global timing advantage
to inject forged packets before a victim receives le-
gitimate packets, which are then correctly discarded
by the target. In contrast, the experiments presented
here investigate a localised implementation of MotS
attacks against two protocols, HTTP and IEC 60870-
5-104 (IEC104). IEC104 is widely used within Eu-
rope and Asia for controlling and monitoring critical
infrastructure e.g. gas, electricity, etc. With state ac-
tors known to be targeting infrastructure such as elec-
tricity grids, our motivation is to better understand
Reproducible experiments can be found at:
https://github.com/PMaynard/mots
how such adversaries may adopt MotS attack tech-
niques, which they are known to have used in the past
in different circumstances.
In 2013, a NIST report (Forrester, 2013) advo-
cated the improvement of industrial networks through
the use of zero-trust networks. DeCusatis et.el
(DeCusatis et al., 2016) discussed how to implement
a zero-trust network, which would mitigate this class
of attacks. DeCusatis implemented a policy engine
and gateway which prevents unauthorised packets
from being accepted by a victim, as well as ensur-
ing that the attacker does not receive identifiable in-
formation when their probe is dropped. However,
within in the Industrial Control System (ICS) domain,
it is not possible to quickly deploy radical changes as
seen with TLS. Information from the National Grid
(National Grid, 2013) shows that this major upgrade
of critical networks is not possible in the time frame
laid out. Due to the long life cycle of ICS equipment
and the criticality of the physical systems they con-
trol, many security recommendations for IT networks
are not suitable for Operational Technology (OT) net-
works. As a consequence OT networks frequently
rely on unencrypted protocols. Threats are typically
mitigated with the use of Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs), air gapped networks, network segmentation,
firewalls, and Demilitarised Zones (DMZs).
However, industrial control networks are often
targeted by state actors, as was the case with the
TRISIS malware (Johnson et al., 2017). This was
a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that targeted Tri-
conex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) devices, and
triggered a shut down of an industrial site in the
Middle East. Another example is CRASHOVER-
RIDE (Dragos, 2017), which performed network enu-
meration and exploitation of Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) protocols includ-
ing IEC104. This malware has been linked to the
Ukrainian power outages in 2016. Therefore, it is
logical to assume that MotS has, or is likely to be,
deployed by similar adversaries into an industrial net-
work at some point in time.
Many papers that propose novel network IDSs,
tend verify their effectiveness using the out-
dated KDD’99 dataset or common attacks (i.e.
MitM, replay and injection (Maynard et al., 2014;
Green et al., 2017)). We provide a modern technique
which should be considered when validating intrusion
detection methods. We investigate the detection re-
sponsiveness of the current state of the art network
IDSs (Snort, Zeek, Suricata) when confronted with
MotS, for both HTTP and IEC104. We provide re-
producible experiments and a packet captures of our
attacks, so they may be used to validate other IDSs.
The paper continues with an overview of related
work (§2) and background (§3), which details what
required for a MotS attack, and introduces ICS/S-
CADA networking architecture. Following on to the
experimentation methodology (§4), and experimental
results (§5). Finally, a review of current detection sys-
tems (§6) and conclusion (§7).
2 RELATEDWORK
In 2012, Gilad et al. (Gilad and Herzberg, 2012)
proved that it is possible to inject packets into a TCP
stream, by using browser based malware to identify
the IP-ID, then spoof a request. Despite reports from
IETF RFC 6528, which state that TCP segment in-
jection is mitigated by having the majority of data
needed to perform this “not well known” to the at-
tacker. While the IETF suggests VPN or TCP Au-
thentication Option (2010) to prevent injection. At
the same, time the IETF acknowledges the TCP reset
vulnerability is a known issue. As of 2019, Alexander
et al. (Alexander et al., 2019) can identify the IP-port
four-tuple representing an active TCP connection, by
taking advantage of side-channels within the Linux
kernel 4.0 and above. Packet injection and TCP resets
are a widely known issue, with current mitigations
easily bypassed. As indicated in the introduction, the
existing state of the art IDSs for ICS networks are not
validated against these types of attacks.
The Chinese Great Firewall exploits the TCP
reset vulnerability, and is discussed by Weaver et
al. (Weaver et al., 2009) (2009) who propose miti-
gations. Also in 2012, Victor Julien added a detec-
tion rule for overlapping data to the open source net-
work IDS Suricata. Essentially, detecting TCP injec-
tion and MotS attacks as seen in the detection section.
In 2014, Gilad et al. (Gilad and Herzberg, 2014) im-
proved upon their previous TCP injection attacks, so
it does not require the use of web malware. They also
detail the history of TCP injection attacks. While Gi-
lad et al. focus on injecting attacks over the internet,
we choose to focus on exploiting a target on the local
network, assuming that it has been compromised by a
skilled adversary.
Between 2013 and 2014, The Guardian
and The Intercept (Schneier, 2013;
Gallagher and Greenwald, 2014) discuss a na-
tion state operation called “QUANTUM Inject”,
which uses their wide scope to monitor and inject
packets into TCP streams. Following this media
attention, the security company Fox-IT performed a
deep dive into QUANTUM Inject (Haagsma, 2015).
They developed a PoC and released patches for a
number of open source network IDSs. In 2015,
a report from the IETF (Trammell et al., 2015)
discussed a threat model of a passive pervasive
attacker, explicitly stating MotS as one example.
The company NetReSec, which performs network
security training and develops a packet analyser tool,
have written a number of times about MotS between
2015-16 (Hjelmvik, 2015). They attempted to raise
awareness of the attack, and developed additional
detection tools as well as identifying TCP injection
attacks from China.
Marczak et al. (Marczak et al., 2015) likened the
Distributed Denial of Service (DOS) attack from
“China’s Great Cannon” to the QUANTUM system.
In that the techniques used to inject packets are sim-
ilar to the QUANTUM Inject method. Finally, the
closest related work the authors identified was by
Nakibly et al. (Nakibly et al., 2016), who detail MotS
attacks being used to inject Javascript, HTTP redirec-
tions and malware dropping. They performed a study
to analyse incoming and outgoing connections of four
university institutions, and identified several differ-
ent threat groups. They proposed a few MotS detec-
tion methods, which use the IP features Time To Live
(TTL) and IP ID, and timing analysis to identifyMotS
in the wild. The authors are unaware of any papers
detailing MotS class of attack on industrial networks,
and are certain there is no academic literature that pro-
vides reproducible experiments and packet captures
that may be used to validate new IDSs.
3 BACKGROUND
MotS, like SYN-flooding and DNS-Spoofing at-
tacks, are known as off-path. This differs from tra-
ditional MitM attacks (Conti et al., 2016) which are
considered on-path. An on-path attacker needs to
control the links between the victim and host, while
an off-path attacker does not. Although MotS is
a weaker class of attack than MitM, it is capable
of packet injection, without having to maintain con-
nections as a proxy. Previous work by the authors
(Maynard et al., 2014) which used Address Resolu-
tion Protocol (ARP) spoofing to maintain an on-the-
path attack, required a large number of ARP packets,
as well as the need to continuously forward packets
to the victim. Depending on the network and host,
this may be easily detectable. It can also be resource
intensive. On the other hand, a MotS attack can be
performed with a minimum of one forged packet.
Also, MotS can not be mitigated by locking down
switch ports using Media Access Control (MAC) Ac-
cess Control Lists (ACLs), which can mitigate MitM.
A MotS attack can be successfully performed if
the attacker can: a) observe a victim’s request; b) ad-
equately replicate a response that the victim would ac-
cept; and c) transmit a response to the victim quicker
than legitimate response. If these three requirements
are met, then an adversay can perform this attack.
Fundamentally, this attack exploits the design of TCP
(RFC 793), whereby it is normal for TCP segments to
arrive more than once, and that the first segment that
arrives is accepted. The attacker needs to be in a po-
sition to know the four-tuple (Local IP address, Local
Port, Remote IP address, Remote Port) that identifies
the target connection, along with the next sequence
number expected by the target.
Figure 1 shows the sequence diagram of a MotS
attack, consisting of a Client, Server and Attacker.
First, the Client initiates a connection with the server
and a TCP handshake is performed, followed by a re-
quest to the server. The attacker is positioned within
the network so that they can view this request (the
attacker does not need to view the handshake). The
attacker creates and sends a forged response, which
spoofs the four-tuple information, including the TCP
Client Attacker Server
1. Initiate Connection
2. Send forged response (X)
3. Send legitimate response (×)
Figure 1: Sequence Diagram of Man-on-the-Side (MotS)
attack.
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Figure 2: A high level network diagram of an Industrial
Control System (ICS).
sequence number. The forged packet is accepted by
the client. Subsequently the legitimate response ar-
rives and is dropped by the client, as it has already
acknowledged the forged packet.
3.1 Industrial Control System Networks
The terms Industrial Control System (ICS) and Super-
visory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) are
often used interchangeably. However, SCADA may
be considered part of an ICS, which is used to mon-
itor and control physical devices. Figure 2 shows a
high level network diagram of an ICS network, that
highlights the different network segments, which have
limited access between each other.
In the diagram, the SCADA enclave is located in
the middle and provides information to the business
network, as well as monitoring the process control
enclave. A Human Machine Interface (HMI) may
be used to monitor the physical process, while
a Data Historian maintains a record of plant op-
erations. The process control enclave contains a
number of devices used to govern physical instru-
ments and actuators that interact with the physical
domain. Typical devices include Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Remote Terminal
Units (RTUs) which are rugged embedded devices
designed for a distinct task. The network may
consist of serial links, Ethernet, and IP, as well as
field bus protocols; one such protocol is IEC104
(International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006).
If MotS were to be performed on ICS network, the
risks to the system may be:
• Unauthorised access to information: Redirect
information to the adversary, further gaining an
insight into the operation of the system.
• Unauthorised modification or theft of informa-
tion: Bypassing controls an injecting modified in-
formation.
• Denial of service or prevention of authorised
access: By injecting packets that cause the device
to trigger a DOS.
• Denial/Claim of action that took/not took
place: By preventing legitimate responses from
arriving the adversary can force records into an
incomplete, or fictitious state.
To perform these attacks on an industrial site with-
out causing any adverse effects on the system would
require a lot of planning and resources. The exact
physical device would need to be tested, and running
the same program code as the live system, while also
ensuring the devices are networked similarly. How-
ever, the attack may also be performed blindly with-
out all the information, yet the exact results may be
unknown.
4 METHODOLOGY
When performing these experiments we assume
that a highly skilled adversary has compromised the
network and has positioned themselves so they can
monitor and inject packets at any point of the network.
This is consistent with previously reported intrusions
of state actors within industrial environments, where
it is viable for an adversary to compromise the net-
work infrastructure, such as switches and routers, and
have this level of provenance. Each experiment is
configured so that there is a: client, server, and at-
tacker. The attacker is positioned so that they are in
between the client and server, this is ensured by intro-
ducing an artificial delay of 500ms to the responding
device. This allows us to validate the methods used to
inject the forged packets. In an industrial setting, the
responding device may be in a remote location, using
several communicationmediums to respond to the op-
erator, such as radio or public internet, providing an
attacker with multiple opportunities. Once the injec-
tion has been completed, a recorded packet capture
is parsed by the three IDSs, and their results manu-
ally analysed. The experiments will focus more on
the IEC104 protocol over HTTP since our aim is to
prove the possibility of applying this attack on proto-
cols other than HTTP(Haagsma, 2015), and within a
localised network.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We performed four different MotS attacks on the
two protocols, HTTP and IEC104. The HTTP exper-
iments inject a false response then redirect the client.
The IEC104 experiments consider the injection of a
recorded response, and a completely forged response.
5.1 HTTP
HTTP is a stateless protocol and is generally closed
after each request/response is completed, resulting
in the TCP handshake has to be performed for
each request. With MotS, it is possible to target
HTTP connections based on IP addresses, as well
as a specific user by triggering on cookie headers
(Gallagher and Greenwald, 2014) and other identifi-
able data sent within a HTTP connection. The net-
work layout consists of three hosts (Client, Server,
and Attacker) and a switch. A 500ms artificial de-
lay has been added to the server to ensure messages
sent by the attacker will reliably arrive ahead of the
legitimate response. When the client initiates a HTTP
GET request, the attacker generates a forged packet
based IP/TCP fields of the request. Then, the attacker
reverses the direction of the IP/TCP source and des-
tination addresses/ports, while the remainder of the
IP header is unchanged. A random IP ID is gen-
erated, and the forged packet’s TCP sequence num-
ber is set to the request’s TCP acknowledgement, and
the forged packet’s TCP acknowledgement to the re-
quest’s TCP sequence number. Finally, the forged
payload is injected and all checksums calculated be-
fore being transmitted to the client. The legitimate re-
sponse from the server arrives at the client afterwards,
and is consequently dropped by the client.
5.1.1 Experiment 1: Inject Response Page
The forged response contains a simple HTML page
with a heading. Instead of the legitimate page, the at-
tacker could inject malicious JavaScript, as seen by
(Nakibly et al., 2016). The result of this exchange
is that the client renders the forged HTTP response
in the web browser, while the legitimate response is
dropped without the browser being notified. The con-
nection needs to be terminated by sending the TCP
flags FIN ACK, which shuts down the connection.
It is worth noting that if the attack uses PUSH ACK
TCP flags, which are the flags set under normal cir-
cumstances, the TCP connection will remain open
and the two payloads are rendered as one by the
browser. This happens even if the HTTP header
Connection: Close is sent.
5.1.2 Experiment 2: Inject Redirect
This time the forged responses contain a ”HTTP 301
Moved Permanently”, instead of ”HTTP 200 OK”.
This status line requires the header field Location,
along with a URI for redirection. Once received, the
browser will automatically open and render the spec-
ified URI. This can be used to redirect the user to an
attacker-controlled site, which has obvious security
implications. The outcome is that the client follows
the 302 redirection URI, and drops the legitimate re-
sponse. Additionally, due to the nature of HTTP, the
server records the Get request into the server logs,
and is not aware that the client did not receive the
response. Consequently, the only way to detect this
happening is to monitor the network layer.
5.2 IEC 60870-5-104
IEC104 (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006)
is a protocol for transporting IEC 60870-5-
101 (IEC101) frames over TCP. IEC101 is a plaintext
telecontrol protocol designed for serial links. In these
experiments we will create forged IEC104 packets
with IEC101 payloads. The structure of an IEC104
packet, comprises two segments, the Application
Service Data Unit (ASDU) and Application Protocol
Control Information (APCI). The ASDU contains
the data to be exchanged, represented as Information
Elements, and data about the number of information
elements are contained within the Data Unit Identi-
fier (DUI). The APCI is sent with all packets and is
used to specify the start/end bits along with the ASDU
length. The protocol manages protection against
loss and duplication of messages using a counter
mechanism. Section 5.1 of EN 60870-5-104:2006
(International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006)
specifies that a send sequence number N(S) and a
receive sequence number N(R) are used based on
the method defined in ITU-T X.25. Both sequence
numbers are incremented by one for each Application
Protocol Data Unit (APDU) and each direction.
These are acknowledged by the receiver, by returning
the receive sequence number N(R) to the sender using
the supervisory format. Once acknowledged, the
sender can remove the correctly transmitted APDUs
from its buffer.
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Figure 3: A generalised network diagram showing two en-
claves: SCADA and Process Control.
Figure 3 describes the SCADA testbed used to
perform the experiments. The attacker is located on
the same Process Control enclave as the PLC, while
the victim, the HMI is located within the SCADA
enclave. The attacker uses the port mirroring fea-
ture of the Process Control switch to monitor the net-
work. The attacker builds the forged packet from the
initial General Interrogation (GI) request sent by the
HMI to the PLC (Figure 3: Step A), by switching
the MAC and IP source/destination addresses, and
switching the TCP sequence and acknowledgement
numbers. Additionally, the send and receive counters
for IEC104 are calculated to match the expected re-
sponse. The attacker then waits for the PLC to send an
ActCon (Figure 3; Step B), before sending the forged
response to the HMI (Figure 3; Step C). In the case
of IEC104, unlike the previously described HTTP at-
tacks, the TCP flags remain as PUSH ACK, which will
be explained later.
These experiments are based on a GI (GI and
C IC NA 1 will be used interchangeably) of a PLC
initiated from the HMI. In normal operation, the PLC
would return its current status in response to a GI. The
testbed is configured to generate and return data that
simulates a real world response. This contains single-
point, double-points, and step-position information.
The objective of these experiments is to investigate
how an attacker can forge a fake response to change
the data viewed by a HMI operator.
Figure 4 is a sequence diagram detailing the
steps of a GI. After the TCP handshake is suc-
HMI PLC
STARTDT Act
STARTDT con
C IC NA 1 Act
C IC NA 1 ActCon
DATA ActCon
S6
S7
Figure 4: Sequence diagram of a Human Machine Interface
(HMI) performing an General Interrogation (GI) command
on a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). The dotted line
shows the injected response.
cessful, the sender will initialise the connection for
data transmission using the STARTDT = act com-
mand, if successful the receiving station will re-
spond with STARTDT = con. Next, the sender
performs a GI request, using an ASDU frame
(C_IC_NA_1 = act), which is acknowledged by re-
ceiving end as C_IC_NA_1 = act con, followed by
the interrogation data. The dotted line is where the
forged packets are injected within the sequence. Fi-
nally, the data is confirmed using the Supervisory for-
mat N(S), containing the number of frames received.
5.2.1 Experiment 3: Inject a Replayed Response
This experiment will replay a pre-captured response
from the PLC, matching the same number of AP-
CI/ASDU responses expected from the PLC, so that
an attacker can hide the physical state from the oper-
ator. Effectively, this attack will force the data vis-
ible to the operator to become out of sync with the
physical process, in a similar way that Stuxnet hid
real-time information from operators. Since this is
a replay attack, the injected response will contain
the same number of information elements, except the
values will be reused from an earlier transmission.
Listing 1 shows a packet capture of this experiment.
The first packets are the TCP handshake (1-3), fol-
lowed by the STARTDT act and STARTDT con mes-
sages (4-6) to start data transmission on this connec-
tion from the HMI to the PLC. The HMI sends a
GI (7), and at this point, the attacker generates the
forged response. The PLC then acknowledges the
GI (8-9), triggering the attacker to send their forged
response (10). The forged response is accepted by
the HMI (11), after which the legitimate GI response
arrives (12), and is marked in the packet capture
as TCP Spurious Retransmission. The HMI re-
sponds to the PLC with a TCP ACK (13), which is
marked as TCP Dup ACK, since it was already used
by the forged response.
After the replayed packet has been accepted, the
PLC software hangs, then drops because the TCP se-
quence number becomes out of sync due to the in-
jected segment. Although, as was the case in the
HTTP experiments, it is possible to close the con-
nection, the operation of IEC104 normally requires
long lived connections. Deliberately bringing down
this connection with a TCP reset could alert a system
administrator to an issue or intrusion within the net-
work. While the result is that the HMI operator is now
viewing stale data, the connectionwill be dropped and
a redundant connection used in its place. The IEC104
standard states that several connections may be main-
tained with the remote device, and periodically re-
freshed using the STARTDT command. Allowing the
connection to degrade using the time out mechanism,
overusing the TCP RST method, reduces the likeli-
hood of triggering an alert.
Listing 1: Packet Capture of IEC104 Experiment 3.
1 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 74 39394 > 2404 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=29200 Len=0
2 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 TCP 74 2404 > 39394 [SYN, ACK]
Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
3 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39394 > 2404 [ACK] Seq=1
Ack=1 Win=29312 Len=0
4 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 104 ap c i 72 <− U (STARTDT a c t )
5 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 104 ap c i 72 −> U (STARTDT con )
6 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39394 > 2404 [ACK] Seq=7
Ack=7 Win=29312 Len=0
7 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 104 asdu 82 <− I ( 0 , 0 ) ASDU=1
C IC NA 1 Act IOA=0
8 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 104 asdu 82 −> I ( 0 , 1 ) ASDU=1
C IC NA 1 ActCon IOA=0
9 10 .5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39394 > 2404 [ACK] Seq
=23 Ack=23 Win=29312 Len=0
10 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 104 asdu 692 −> I ( 1 , 1 ) ASDU=1
C IC NA 1 ActCon IOA=0 | −> I ( 2 , 1 ) ASDU=1
M SP NA 1 I n r og en IOA [ 6 0 ] = 6 5 5 8 3 , . . . | −> I ( 3 , 1 )
ASDU=1 M SP NA 1 I n r og en IOA [ 4 4 ] = 1 1 2 0 3 6 6 , . . . | −> I
( 4 , 1 ) ASDU=1 M DP NA 1 I n r og en IOA [ 3 0 ] = 5 6 1 1 9 2 , . . . |
−> I ( 5 , 1 ) ASDU=1 M ST NA 1 I n r og en IOA
[ 2 ] = 1 8 7 4 0 1 9 , . . . | −> I ( 6 , 1 ) ASDU=1 C IC NA 1
ActTerm IOA=0
11 10 .5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39394 > 2404 [ACK] Seq
=23 Ack=649 Win=30464 Len=0
12 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 104 asdu 692 [TCP Spu r i o u s
Re t r a n sm i s s i o n ] | −> I ( 1 , 1 ) ASDU=1 C IC NA 1
ActCon IOA=0 | −> I ( 2 , 1 ) ASDU=1 M SP NA 1 I n r og en
IOA [ 6 0 ] = 6 5 5 8 3 , . . . | −> I ( 3 , 1 ) ASDU=1 M SP NA 1
I n r og en IOA [ 4 4 ] = 1 1 2 0 3 6 6 , . . . | −> I ( 4 , 1 ) ASDU=1
M DP NA 1 I n r og en IOA [ 3 0 ] = 5 6 1 1 9 2 , . . . | −> I ( 5 , 1 )
ASDU=1 M ST NA 1 I n r og en IOA [ 2 ] = 1 8 7 4 0 1 9 , . . . | −> I
( 6 , 1 ) ASDU=1 C IC NA 1 ActTerm IOA=0
13 10 .5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 78 [TCP Dup ACK 11#1] 39394
> 2404 [ACK] Seq=23 Ack=649 Win=30464 Len=0
5.2.2 Experiment 4: Inject Two Step Position
Responses
This experiment will investigate injecting two step
position responses into the connection, rendering the
HMI with an incomplete view of the system. In Ex-
periment 3, an old response was returned containing
the full amount of expected data, however in Exper-
iment 4 a forged response containing only two step
position values, i.e. fewer than expected, will be
returned. The motivation for this experiment is to
determine what would happen when a smaller than
expected response arrives on an active TCP connec-
tion. Note that in the HTTP experiments two payloads
would be rendered as one if the connection was not
terminated. Listing 2 shows a packet capture of this
experiment. The first packets are the TCP handshake
and IEC104 start data transfer acknowledgement (1-
6). Next, the GI request and acknowledgement are
seen (7-9), followed by the forged packet (10-11).
Note the payload is 120bits compared to the legiti-
mate payload of 692bits (12). As with the previous
experiment, the HMI confirms the received frames us-
ing the Supervisory format (14), this time with the re-
ceive sequence number of 4, since there were 4 frames
sent: Opening interrogation command “ActCon”; two
step positions; and Closing interrogation command
“ActTerm”. Subsequently, the connection keeps us-
ing the wrong TCP sequence number which eventu-
ally causes it to time out.
Listing 2: Packet Capture of IEC104 Experiment 4.
1 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 74 39440 > 2404 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=29200 Len=0
2 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 TCP 74 2404 > 39440 [SYN, ACK]
Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
3 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39440 > 2404 [ACK] Seq=1
Ack=1 Win=29312 Len=0
4 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 104 ap c i 72 <− U (STARTDT a c t )
5 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 104 ap c i 72 −> U (STARTDT con )
6 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39440 > 2404 [ACK] Seq=7
Ack=7 Win=29312 Len=0
7 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 104 asdu 82 <− I ( 0 , 0 ) ASDU=1
C IC NA 1 Act IOA=0
8 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 104 asdu 82 −> I ( 0 , 1 ) ASDU=1
C IC NA 1 ActCon IOA=0
9 10 .5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39440 > 2404 [ACK] Seq
=23 Ack=23 Win=29312 Len=0
10 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 104 asdu 120 −> I ( 1 , 1 ) ASDU=1
C IC NA 1 ActCon IOA=0 | −> I ( 2 , 1 ) ASDU=1
M ST NA 1 I n r og en IOA [ 2 ] = 1 8 7 4 0 1 9 , . . . | −> I ( 3 , 1 )
ASDU=1 C IC NA 1 ActTerm IOA=0
11 10 .5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 66 39440 > 2404 [ACK] Seq
=23 Ack=77 Win=29312 Len=0
12 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 > 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 TCP 692 [TCP Out−Of−Order ] 2404
> 39440 [PSH, ACK] Seq=23 Ack=23 Win=66560 Len=6
13 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 TCP 78 [TCP Dup ACK 11#1] 39440
> 2404 [ACK] Seq=23 Ack=77 Win=29312 Len=0
14 10 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 1 03 > 1 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 9 9 104 ap c i 72 <− S ( 4 )
The PLC and the web server both had an artificial
delay of 500ms to allow for the injected packets to
reach the victim before the legitimate response. This
is due to the limited scale of the laboratory testbed,
and consequent low latency, this enabled the exper-
iments to be developed without concern for the at-
tacker to beat the legitimate packets. Nonetheless,
in this testbed, when the artificial delays were com-
pletely removed, it was found that the forged response
would arrive ahead of the legitimate response approx-
imately 1 in 7 times.
Table 1: Network IDS detection results. ( ) Yes (#) No
(G#) Partial
HTTP IEC104
Experiment 1 2 3 4
Zeek G# G# G# G#
Snort  G# # #
Suricata   #  
6 DETECTION
Each of the four experiments were analysed of-
fline using three of the most recent state of the art net-
work Intrusion Detection Systems. These are Zeek
2.6.2 (formerly Bro), Snort 2.9.13-1, and Suricata
4.1.4. All of the engines were updated to the latest
public rule sets as of May 2019, and were configured
to parse offline packet capture files. Table 1 shows
details of the detection results for all three engines.
Successful detection is recorded as either ’Yes’, ’No’,
or ’Partial’. ’Yes’ indicates an exact match on the
correct packet, with the triggered rule returning an
accurate description of the respective attack. ’Par-
tial’ means, for example, a rule triggered at the cor-
rect time but the reason for the alert, or the descrip-
tion provided, was not accurate. ’No’ indicates no
IDS alert was triggered. Zeek could be considered
the least accurate of the three engines in terms of its
alerts. For the HTTP experiments, Zeek alerted with
‘FIN advanced last seq’. This alert is triggered be-
cause of the server accepting the forged packet, which
brings down the connection. For the IEC104 experi-
ments Zeek alerts with ‘window recision’ on the exact
injected packet. However the IDS was not triggering
due to the specific MotS activity, rather it alerted be-
cause the TCP recv-window shrank by more than the
amount of data being ACKed, as detailed in RFC793
Section 3.7, which is strongly discouraged. There-
fore, although Zeek alerted in all four cases, the rea-
son for each alert would not be obvious to an ana-
lyst monitoring the alerts. Zeek has built in support
for detecting MotS attacks since 2015, however, it is
disabled by default and does not detect the experi-
ments. Snort alerted on the correct injected packet
in the first HTTP experiment, with the message ‘IN-
VALID CONTENT-LENGTH OR CHUNK SIZE” us-
ing the ’http inspect’ module. The second HTTP ex-
periment was also correctly detected, however, the
alerts are due to the legitimate segments arriving after
the connection is closed with ‘Data sent on stream not
accepting data’ and ‘Reset outside window’. These
are seen in both experiments 1 and 2. The only event
which Snort alerts for regarding the IEC104 injec-
tions are ‘Consecutive TCP small segments exceed-
ing threshold’, which is due to the server attempting
to renegotiate the connection, and causing a time out.
Therefore this was considered as not specifically de-
tecting the MotS attack. Suricata had the most accu-
rate detection of the three IDSs. With the HTTP ex-
periments, the ACK packets with the wrong sequence
numbers are detected and, as with Snort, the first
HTTP injection is detected with ‘SURICATA HTTP
unable to match response to request’. The most inter-
esting alert is ‘SURICATA STREAM reassembly over-
lap with different data’, which exactly describes the
MotS attack. This is displayed for all experiments,
except experiment 3, which related to injecting a re-
played response. Experiment 3 did not trigger any
alerts from Suricata, because the forged payload was
the same as the legitimate one.
7 CONCLUSION
Further work should be performed for each of the
NIDS to include detection alerts for the MotS class of
attacks. While Suricata can detect this, and notify the
operator with a somewhat descriptive name, it fails
to articulate the issue as a malicious action. Network
IDS for deployment within OT networks must have
support for the industrial protocols, otherwise, detec-
tion of these kinds of attacks and others will go unno-
ticed. As discussed in the introduction, zero-trust net-
works, VPNs (to an extent), and TLS are the best mit-
igations of this class of attack. IEC104 is has a com-
panion standard, IEC 62351, detailing securing end
to end communication, however in internal networks,
these defences are often not deployed. In part due to a
lax security mindset, or the additional complexity and
risk of deployment. While this class of attack is miti-
gated for much of the public internet via TLS, critical
network operators need to be aware of the potential
damage this attack may have on a system. Although
deploying a mitigation approach such as zero-trust
networking is the gold standard, many network opera-
tors are not in a position to do so. Threat actors, such
as nation states have used this method successfully
over several years, and it seems likely this approach
will continue to be exploited in the future. Especially
in the ICS domain, where unauthenticated local traffic
such as IEC104 is still commonplace. As the experi-
ments with Zeek, Snort and Suricata have shown, fur-
ther work is required to provide these network IDS
platforms with the detection rules and mechanisms
capable of accurately detecting MotS being exploited
by an intruder.
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